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Abstract: 
In the poorest countries like Ethiopia the spillover effects of a soaring food price 
is unbearable. To mitigate the recent rise in food prices and the burden on urban 
poor consumers, policy makers have considered various measures. A recent shift 
from subsidizing oil to grain to ease the spiraling cost of food is one attempt the 
Ethiopian government has made so far. To this end, the government has removed 
an $800m annual subsidy on petroleum products and used the money to combat 
rising grain prices. Using the standard GTAP model and the recent GTAP Africa 
database, this paper simulates the overall implication of 5 and 10 percent 
increase of subsidy on wheat. Regarding the impact on prices, the simulation 
result tells us that prices have indeed fall. At macro level, the result reveals 
subsidy on wheat leads to a decline in the overall trade balance. In terms of 
welfare, the intervention is likely to have a positive impact. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Food prices are accelerating at their fastest rate since 2006 resulting from, among 
other things, the price of oil, speculation on the financial markets, erratic weather 
patterns, subsidized production of bio-fuels, and population growth. The rising 
cost of food is becoming a major source of global social instability and economic 
hardships. In developing countries, the problem is worse in terms of rising 
poverty and hunger. In the poorest countries like Ethiopia, the spillover effect of a 
soaring food price is unbearable. It could be, both in terms of the adverse effects 
on the poor, and on the risk, it poses to macroeconomic stability through adverse 
                                                 
1 Department of Economics,  Arba Minch University,  P.O.Box 21,Arba Minch, Ethiopia, E-mail 
Getachew.A.Woldie@gmail.com  
 
2 Department of Agriculture and Food Policy, University of Hohenheim, Stuttgart , Germany, E-mail 
khalidhasiddig@yahoo.com  
2 
 
effects on growth and inflation and large swings in the terms of trade with 
important balance of payments consequence. It is argued that the urban poor as 
well as food deficit farmers are the worst affected by food price inflation as they 
rely on food purchases (IMF, 2008a). It should not also be ignored that food- 
surplus farmers may not also benefit from food price increase, as the pass-through 
of higher input costs is also often faster than that of the world market price for 
food. To mitigate the rise in food prices and the burden on urban poor consumers, 
different measures were considered by policy makers. International organizations 
including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have actively involved in the 
provision of advice and support to address this urgent concern. Different countries 
have also responded in different ways for this recent sharp increase in food prices. 
The responses take different forms among others a decrease in food tax either in 
the form of reducing import duties and consumption taxes or in the form of 
curtailing export of food grains. According to IMF (2008a), for instance food 
taxes were reduced in 84 countries between 2006 and 2008 of which 76 countries 
have cut food import taxes and 22 countries reduced VAT rates. The above report 
also confirmed that about 22 countries have increased food subsidies. Exporting 
countries have on the other hand used both tax and regulatory measures that 
include increase in export taxes, the introduction of export quotas, and even the 
imposition of outright bans on certain exports. Some 30 rice-exporting countries 
have imposed a clear export restriction or bans. 
With the growing debate on WTO accession issues in so many developing 
countries including Ethiopia, policy makers also face challenges in making use of 
such instruments as acceding to the WTO means no room for such instruments 
even in cases where the effectiveness of government intervention rather than 
letting the market sort out some of the challenges such as that posed by the food 
price inflation.  
In Ethiopia, an increase in food prices over the years 2004 to 2008 have been 
observed and the food inflation rates(end of period) has exhibit an all-time high 
levels in 2008 (Ulimwengu, etal., 2009). At the national level, the inflation rate 
steadily increased from a mere 3.4 percent in 2004 to 13.6 percent in 2006 and 
rose further to 34.9 percent by June 2008. Recent statistics show that food price 
inflation is still rising. Country level food inflation rate reaches 60.9 percent in 
January 2009 which is 38.1 percentage points higher than that of 22.8 percent 
inflation rate at January 2008. This higher increase in the food inflation rate was 
due to the increase in price of the food components like cereals, pulses, meat, oils 
and fats (specially butter), milk and egg, vegetable and fruits, potatoes  and other 
tubers and stems, and food taken away from home(Central Statistical Agency, 
2009).  
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A recent shift from subsidizing oil to grain to ease the spiraling cost of food is one 
attempt the Ethiopian government has made so far. To this end, the government 
has removed an $800m annual subsidy on petroleum products and uses the money 
to combat rising grain prices as well as eliminating value- added taxes on grains. 
In addition, the government has also curtailed export of cereals in a way to 
stabilize the soaring price that hit most of the low income population. Despite the 
fact that protecting the poor and other vulnerable groups from the impact of rising 
prices are justified from policy point of view, a thorough investigation should be 
made in terms of efficiency, welfare and particularly from the pressure it creates 
on fiscal policy point of view. 
Theoretically, subsidies (particularly price subsidies) are primarily used to either 
alter consumption and production patterns by changing the relative prices both 
consumers and producers face or to affect resource allocation and distribution for 
achieving equity. However it should be considered when one think of subsidies 
that there are some costs both in terms of high fiscal costs and the spillover effects 
onto prices and quantities in other markets (IMF, 2008b). In different countries 
following the recent sharp increase in food prices, subsidies are coming under 
renewed scrutiny, which requires investigation of the overall impacts to the 
economy. According to IMF (2008a) food inflation in developing countries which 
is already 10 percent higher than the advanced economies would have been higher 
in the absence of food subsidies. 
Cognizant of the fact in this context, using the standard GTAP model and the 
recent GTAP Africa database this paper simulates the overall implication of 
recent policy responses to mitigate soaring food prices. The findings from this 
paper are appealing as it addresses an important aspect that continues to divide 
policy analysts.  First, it gives insights on how government intervention is indeed 
effective compared with the market mechanism during challenges such as that 
posed by the food price inflation. If governments should intervene, how should 
such intervention be perceived or negotiated in multilateral rules based trading 
environment? This paper might offer some insights to these questions. With 
Ethiopia as a WTO acceding country3, would Ethiopia be able to make use of 
such instruments if it accedes to the WTO? The findings of this research, 
therefore, might have some relevance to public policy concerning the ongoing 
negotiation by helping the Ethiopian negotiators to know some of the areas that 
are important when it comes to the useful question of policy space. 
                                                 
3 Ethiopia requested for WTO accession on 13 January 2003 and General Council established a working Party on 
10 February 2003. The on-going negotiation on WTO accession is clear evidence about the country’s status of 
opening up its economy. 
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses state 
of food price inflation in Ethiopia and some remedies taken so far. The third 
section presents a brief description of the methodology used. The fourth section 
discusses simulation results while the final section draws conclusions and policy 
implication of results of the study. 
2. FOOD PRICE INFLATION AND GOVERNMENT 
RESPONSES IN ETHIOPIA 
As it has been explained earlier, sky rocketing food prices have been at the center 
of policy debates and pose challenges to policy makers. In the past two three 
years World food prices reached the highest ever in history. According to 
Ulimwengu et al.  (2009), the price of wheat has more than tripled in the world 
market while maize prices have more than doubled. Price of rice has also jumped 
to its record level. 
Different factors have been cited as responsible for the soaring food prices. 
Increase in the production of biofuels, rapid economic growth in most developing 
countries and population pressure are among them. 
 
Figure 1: Monthly trend of food price indices and World oil price (January 2001-June 
2008) 
Source:  Ulimwengu, Workneh & Paulos (2009) 
Studies show that the Ethiopian case is even worse as food price index has been 
always higher since 2004 than the world index and has something to do with the 
rise of the prices of oil in the world market (see Figure 1).  
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It should be noted that even when the world oil price dropped in September 2006 
and June 2007, the Ethiopian food price index remains rising. 
Food price inflation in general has shown an increasing trend since 2004 (Figure 
2). Accordingly, food price inflation in Ethiopia has increased from its 3.4 level in 
2004 to its highest ever at the end of 2008. 
 
Figure 2: Food price inflation in Ethiopia, end-of period rates (%) 
Source: Central Statistics Agency (2009) 
It should be considered that cereals are dominant in Ethiopia taking the lion’s 
share of household budget and food price inflation mainly comes from rise in 
price of cereals. Hence, it is expected that from welfare point of view 
compensation or loss due to price increase is much higher for cereals than for 
other food items (Ulimwengu et al., 2009). As the most vulnerable social group in 
Ethiopia  highly depend on  cereal consumption, in response to soaring food 
prices there seems to be a consensus for implementation of expansion of social 
safety net programs that target this group (von Braun et al., 2008). In general, 
increasing food prices presnt a difficult policy challenges for governments. Below 
we discuss some of the responses from the Ethiopian government in mitigating 
food price increase.  
Bearing in mind that food takes about 60 percent of the consumer price index 
(CSA, 2009), and food price inflation is higher than the non-food price inflation, 
policy makers have focused on stabilizing food prices. One attempt in response to 
the challenges posed by soaring food price inflation was subsidizing wheat price 
by shifting resources, which already used in fuel price subsidy motivated by the 
sudden decline in the oil price in international market. A subsidized wheat supply 
of 25kg every month for low-income urban dwellers was introduced in March 
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2007. The subsidized price of wheat is about 350 birr4 per quintal (100 kg) while 
the market price of domestic wheat was around 750 birr per quintal. This coupled 
with the reduction in domestic taxes on grains expected to result in a further 
decline in price.  
According to the market  report of World Food Program (2008), in  October  2008 
prices of local grains declined in most markets across the country, mainly due to 
supply of new harvests. And food assistance interventions and the government’s 
urban price stabilization program also considered as factors for the decreasing 
prices. However, the price level is still very high as compared to the same period 
last year. For instance, compared to October 2007, the price is higher by 101 
percent for maize; 94 percent for wheat and 137 percent for sorghum.  
Apart from the above policy responses the government has also has raised the 
cash wage rate of the largest cash-for-work program by 33% (World Bank, 2008) 
in a way to increase the purchasing power of the poor. 
Ethiopia has also banned the export of grains for an indefinite period of time in a 
way to stabilize the domestic price of grains. There are no studies however on the 
likely impact of such trade restriction and embargoes and whether or not such 
actions indeed reduced domestic prices and improved welfare. 
The government, apart from the fiscal and trade policies, has also considered a 
monetary policy measure by increasing reserve requirements from 5 to 10 percent. 
A banking system in which commercial banks having already excess reserves, it 
is less likely that such monetary measures indeed responded to the price surge. In 
this paper we focus on the overall impact of wheat subsidy. Looking at the impact 
of the export ban, and a reduction on domestic taxes and an increase in the reserve 
requirement is beyond this paper and hence not discussed. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
The current study is entirely based on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
and the New African database. GTAP was established in 1992 at Purdue 
University, USA. The main objectives of which were to combine research efforts 
of many international experts in quantitative policy modeling and to lower entry 
costs for researchers who are willing to conduct economy-wide analysis of 
international economic issues given the fact that the start-up costs for model 
development, data collection and calibration are very high for complex multi-
sector, multi-region models (Hertel, 1997).  
                                                 
4  Birr is Ethiopian currency and 1 USD = 13 birr in March 2010. 
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The global CGE modeling framework of the GTAP, is the best possible way for 
the ex ante analysis of the economic and trade consequences of comprehensive 
multilateral or bilateral trade agreements (Hertel, 1997). The GTAP model is a 
comparative static, global CGE model based on neoclassical theories. The GTAP 
model is a linearized model, using a common global database for the CGE 
analysis. It assumes perfect competition in all markets, constant returns to scale in 
all production and trade activities, and profit and utility maximizing behavior of 
firms and households respectively, and it is solved using GEMPACK software 
(Harrison & Pearson, 1996).  
The GTAP Africa database is a special version based on GTAP 6 database. It 
includes data for 39 regions (30 African regions and 9 other aggregated regions) 
and the 57 sectors of the GTAP 6 Database. Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, and Sudan are the new 
IO tables that have been contributed by African economists. Further, the missing 
bi-lateral trade flows for the African regions have been econometrically 
estimated, using the gravity approach, which is documented in Estimation of 
Missing Intra-African Trade by  Villoria (2008).   
The GTAP African database is helpful in assisting African policy makers in their 
way to assess quantitatively different trade agreements currently under 
negotiation. A more specific and disaggregated policy analysis in Africa was 
constrained by data limitation and this special database expected to loosen such 
constraints. Hence, the current study is also appealing from methodological 
grounds as an anonymous reviewer puts: 
 “The paper makes use of the new African database, which requires a lot of 
 interrogation in order to build confidence in it, even as it complements the 
 normal GTAP database. To see an application of the database is welcome 
 and would be a useful contribution to raising the awareness of using this 
 kind of data to deal with policy questions” 
Finally, based on the above methodology and data structure below an attempt is 
made to simulate a policy scenario for Ethiopia. 
4. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This section reports simulation results that show the overall effect of a 5 and 10 
percent subsidy on wheat and particularly due emphasis is given on its implication 
to the recent food price surges.  
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4.1 Overall impact 
The overall impact of a 5% and 10% subsidy on wheat in Ethiopia is summarized 
in Table 1 below. To this end, following a 5 percent and 10 percent subsidy on 
wheat, which is the major cereal in Ethiopia’s household consumption and an 
input for most food processing factories, trade balance is negatively affected. 
Trade balance deteriorates by 1.97 percent for a 5 percent subsidy and decline by 
3.65 percent following a 10 percent subsidy rate.   
Table 1: Overall effects of a 5%% and 10 % wheat subsidy in Ethiopia 
                Scenarios 
Variables 5% 10% 
Trade balance -1.97 -3.65 
GDP quantity index 0 -0.01 
Volume of merchandise imports -0.24 -0.47 
Volume of merchandise exports -0.8 -1.52 
GDP value index 0.1 0.17 
Value of merchandise imports -0.24 -0.47 
Value of merchandise exports -0.62 -1.18 
Household income 0.1 0.18 
Household consumption expenditure 0.08 0.15 
Equivalent variation (EV) 2.45 4.18 
 
When we look at the trade balance impact at sectoral level, it can be observed 
from Figure 3 below that wheat trade balance has been improved in both scenario 
cases.  
As expected trade balances for other cereals other than wheat has significantly 
deteriorated following the subsidy on wheat.  The livestock and milk products, 
heavy and light manufacturing, transport and communication, and other services 
sectors have also shown a slight decline in the their respective trade balances.  It 
should be apparent that commodities’ balance of trade reflects the direction of 
producers’ preferences either towards the local market or to the international 
market given the comparative advantage that each sector has and its ability to 
compete. In this regard, the improvement in the trade balance of wheat clearly 
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shows the preference of consumers towards the domestic wheat than the imported 
ones. 
 
 
Figure 3: Effects of wheat subsidy on trade balance 
GDP in terms of quantity index is not affected in the first scenario and has shown 
0.01 percent decline following the second scenario. However, GDP in terms of 
value index has risen by about 0.1 percent in both cases.  
Both volume of merchandise imports and exports have declined in both scenarios. 
Volume of merchandise imports have decline by 0.24 and 0.47 percent following 
a 5 percent and 10 percent subsidy on wheat respectively. As expected, household 
consumption expenditure has increased in both cases. 
The overall welfare impact of such policy as observed by the equivalent variation  
shows that the policy result in an increase in a welfare by 2.45 millions of US 
dollar for  a 5 percent subsidy and even increases to 4.18 millions of US dollar for 
a 10 percent subsidy. 
4.2 Impact on Price, household demand and domestic sales 
Table 2 in the appendix summarizes the effect of a 5% and 10 % wheat subsidy 
on price, domestic sales, and household demand.  The simulation result reveals 
that in both scenarios private consumption price in general, private domestic 
consumption price, and aggregate imports market price for wheat all have fallen 
following the subsidy on wheat. The fall in price is huge for imports, may be 
because the government has supplied huge amount of imported wheat. According 
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to Fortune (2008) the government has recently imported about 300,000 tons of 
wheat and distributed it for 350 birr per 100 kg in response to the soaring food 
prices. It is reported that when the market price of domestic wheat was about 750 
birr per 100 kg, the market price of imported wheat gone down for 560 birr per 
100 kg mainly because the quality of the imported wheat was lower compared to 
the domestic ones. This can be explained by a fall in household demand for 
imported wheat. Following a 5% and 10 % subsidy on wheat household demand 
for imported wheat has significantly fallen by 11.62 and 21.94 percent 
respectively.  
Household demand for domestic wheat has indeed increase by about 6.3 percent 
following a 5 percent subsidy on wheat and by about 12.3 percent for a 10 percent 
increase in wheat subsidy. Domestic sales have also increased by 6. 5 and 12.5 
percent for a 5 and 10 percent increase in wheat subsidy respectively. 
As expected price of other grain crops have shown a slight increase following the 
wheat subsidy. However, household demand for these commodities did not 
change significantly in both scenario cases.  
The impact of the subsidy on other sectors is also presented in Table 2. Despite 
there are positive signs on price in the other sectors in general, the values are not 
more than 0.2 percent and hence not discussed. 
4.3 Impact on Domestic Output 
As it was said earlier, subsidy is expected to affect both composition and 
allocation of domestic output in production. To this end, the impact of wheat 
subsidy on domestic output is portrayed in Figure 4.  
As expected domestic wheat output significantly and positively responded to 
wheat subsidy in both scenario cases. Even though there are some contractions in 
the output of other sectors, most of them little affected following the subsidy. 
There is only about 2 percent decline in domestic output of oilseeds may be 
because there is some resource competition between the wheat and oil seeds 
sectors. 
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Figure 4: Effects of wheat subsidy on domestic output 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, an effort has been made to show the likely impact of subsidies in 
curbing soaring food prices using the new GTAP African database for Ethiopia. 
The study sheds some light on the role of government intervention in food price 
stabilization rather than letting the market sort out some of the challenges posed 
by the food price inflation. As Ethiopia, requesting for a WTO accession, the 
paper may have also some policy implications on how should such intervention be 
perceived or negotiated in multilateral rules based trading environment. To this 
end, we simulate the overall implication of 5 percent and 10 percent increase in 
subsidy on wheat.  Regarding the impact on prices, the simulation result tells us 
that prices have indeed fall. At macro level, the result reveals subsidy on wheat 
leads to a decline in the overall trade balance. In terms of welfare, the intervention 
has been found to have positive impact. 
However, with the growing concern on WTO and other regional negotiations, 
subsidy may not be available as a first best option and policy makers should 
consider alternative measures in stabilizing food prices.  The result may also be 
different if we consider a household level CGE analysis as the subsidy we 
considered here does not differentiate the vulnerable and needy people. Targeted 
cash transfers to vulnerable groups usually considered as first best options as 
these support the purchasing power of the poor without distorting domestic 
incentives to produce more food, and without reducing the incomes of poor food 
net sellers from a reduced price. Future research therefore, should focus on the 
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impact of price stabilization policies on specific household groups, which can 
only done using a household level analysis.  Research also needed to evaluate the 
efficacy of alternative intervention in curbing soaring food price in particular and 
improving welfare in general. In doing so, the following questions should be 
answered. What would be the likely impact of reducing tariffs and other taxes on 
key staples vis-á-vis direct subsidy? What would be the implication of an export 
ban on key staples in a soaring price situation? How should such intervention be 
perceived or negotiated in the context multilateral rules based trading 
environment?  
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